In a Clear Election, the returns data is freely available on the web.

Sample Election Returns Website
Download
Turnout: 97 voters
# Voter
1. Donnie Allscheid
2. Rogelio Bancourt
3. Calista Baugher
4. Josef Belote
5. Thalia Birchett
6. Christina Bompane
7. Loura Browers
8. Dick Bryner
9. Doug Chanin
10. Tora Cheek
11. Melody Cohoe
12. Jorge Cumblidge
13. Claude Deans
14. Palmer Degeyter
15. Hyo Dockter
16. George Drozd
17. Billy Duplessis
18. Maud Ekis
19. Brady Elstner
20. Major Endler
21. Humberto Enwall
22. Johnny Espiridion
23. Malissa Everson
24. Carl Fickle
25. Jude Fralick
26. Wilburn Fulda
27. Grazyna Goldberg
28. Tristan Grambo
29. Dino Hatler
30. Mara Haubrich
31. Alfred Hinchliffe
32. Vernon Hreha
33. Danilo Hurlbut
34. Claud Karroach
35. Chris Keaffaber
36. Alex Kieke
37. Cassondra Kirkner
38. Travis Kleiboeker
39. Christian Klepacz
40. Lyda Krakowski
41. Magan Laduc
42. Mauro Liptow
43. Galen Liquori
44. Santos Malueg
45. Enoch McInnis
46. Olin Meduna
47. Pat Minix
48. Merle Moment
49. Eugena Nagasawa
50. Corey Nerio
51. Dominque Nicklos
52. Jarvis Nisonger
53. Al Notari
54. Kristel Papin
55. Parker Papson
56. Oren Pollo
57. Verona Popec
58. Shanice Portello
59. Faith Putnam
60. Shaun Radune
61. Oliva Rafter
62. Rickey Rangitsch
63. Perry Readinger
64. Mitsue Reistetter
65. Lissette Reives
66. Barton Respers
67. Mila Retzler
68. Ling Roddey
69. Tarah Roelofs
70. Kareen Rogol
71. Everett Romain
72. Enedina Rotenberg
73. Jona Sain
74. Rocio Scandalios
75. Lakendra Sinagra
76. Kristina Steinberger
77. Tabitha Suit
78. Lue Sunderman
79. Hildegard Swanay
80. Manuel Syrett
81. Lisandra Tail
82. Rolland Taormina
83. Sidney Thomases
84. Fernando Tille
85. Stacey Tomasek
86. Larae Tompkins
87. Ambrose VanWyk
88. Aileen Veller
89. Portia Virola
90. Walker Wellspeak
91. Hugo Whack
92. Milly Whittley
93. Chet Woy
94. Karan Yackley
95. Margareta Yetto
96. Kraig Zabriskie
97. Donald Zaverl
Cast: 97 ballots
# Ballot ID President Prop. A
1. ACHS24JTDS Mitchell Mellekas NO
2. ADRW6ZWJVT Tonja Dyche YES
3. AFB9Q7TG1C Cassey Bulik NO
4. AJ27NSDFM8 Tonja Dyche NO
5. AKZFFGGPGP Tonja Dyche NO
6. B01WLJPFWV Rosaria Durisseau NO
7. B20J3TKPJ1 Spencer Kourt NO
8. B35WJLHXT7 Brynn Eckley YES
9. BBP03P9X7Q Spencer Kourt YES
10. BJ8FMG72D1 Spencer Kourt NO
11. C11RF0M4R5 Spencer Kourt YES
12. C4SGDDW4J2 Cassey Bulik YES
13. CXLK725M8H Brynn Eckley NO
14. D3G1FLBQPP Rosaria Durisseau YES
15. D50XMGZBFF Spencer Kourt NO
16. DGM268F0WH Spencer Kourt NO
17. DLDVNF8LT4 Brynn Eckley YES
18. DMDQVT7H2F Spencer Kourt NO
19. DS8404W1DT Cassey Bulik NO
20. F08WVFQCBL Mitchell Mellekas NO
21. FG6TZP19J8 Rosaria Durisseau YES
22. FTFR92C1QQ Spencer Kourt YES
23. G13XN5HXL5 Cassey Bulik NO
24. GD4VR6LHDT Tonja Dyche YES
25. GJ77CZ7BV2 Brynn Eckley YES
26. GVTMRJTBJJ Rosaria Durisseau NO
27. GXSN18GPQP Tonja Dyche YES
28. H4KQ7C6WJC Mitchell Mellekas YES
29. H7SMLX54RD Cassey Bulik NO
30. HFNNS29NXJ Cassey Bulik YES
31. HH5FRQC4MD Brynn Eckley NO
32. HSXZ5J9GQM Spencer Kourt NO
33. HT6M1TVRTQ Cassey Bulik YES
34. J6DXVDLKFX Brynn Eckley YES
35. J8NQTDCCX8 Brynn Eckley NO
36. J99CR8RGQC Mitchell Mellekas NO
37. J9BRX18FQV Tonja Dyche YES
38. JNBHN5ZMDV Tonja Dyche NO
39. K374NT5BJ4 Spencer Kourt NO
40. KQX87XHQ1K Brynn Eckley YES
41. KSMF725G89 Spencer Kourt NO
42. KWMXPWDQXW Spencer Kourt NO
43. KX5FMRRP7G Cassey Bulik YES
44. KZBQPG5562 Mitchell Mellekas YES
45. L6H592W9HR Rosaria Durisseau NO
46. L6R7JC9CCT Spencer Kourt NO
47. LPCHNX52ML Rosaria Durisseau YES
48. LW20JZLX7Q Brynn Eckley NO
49. MQ6RRWB5KH Tonja Dyche YES
50. MQL8V32S4B Rosaria Durisseau YES
51. MSVPPCJRMW Tonja Dyche YES
52. N14T6NT5XB Rosaria Durisseau NO
53. NKD9V59NJN Tonja Dyche NO
54. NPKPCXJXSS Cassey Bulik YES
55. NR0GMDB8GJ Brynn Eckley NO
56. P2H32NFWDM Brynn Eckley YES
57. PBKMDS3JZD Mitchell Mellekas YES
58. PK1V7BN3DV Mitchell Mellekas NO
59. PSSLJJ616X Brynn Eckley NO
60. PZKTZLFNNT Cassey Bulik NO
61. Q9ZHSSZ3HJ Brynn Eckley YES
62. QDL1KNNJHC Rosaria Durisseau NO
63. QWQJJ767KQ Mitchell Mellekas NO
64. R2JXCPTWJC Cassey Bulik YES
65. R49257PRM0 Rosaria Durisseau YES
66. R4XVVH0LD5 Cassey Bulik YES
67. RFKS49RVPZ Rosaria Durisseau NO
68. S0B72LQWGP Mitchell Mellekas YES
69. SCKKTXRCZP Mitchell Mellekas NO
70. SD5KPWFPDT Rosaria Durisseau YES
71. SKRBVCSFPL Mitchell Mellekas YES
72. SVX0W9GLX4 Rosaria Durisseau YES
73. SXXTMXP295 Brynn Eckley NO
74. TRHNSX2NHS Brynn Eckley NO
75. TT8V2024HT Cassey Bulik YES
76. V0ZCMN3G53 Rosaria Durisseau NO
77. VGX7C9SRRV Brynn Eckley NO
78. VL1ZJGT4MQ Mitchell Mellekas YES
79. VMV379XK64 Tonja Dyche NO
80. VQV1128VNN Spencer Kourt YES
81. VVGF23LJNX Cassey Bulik NO
82. W5X3Q8BG7H Spencer Kourt NO
83. W8K5M3Z0HM Spencer Kourt YES
84. W99F8R8B70 Mitchell Mellekas NO
85. WC14F7MXC6 Tonja Dyche NO
86. WF11VZH7KQ Spencer Kourt NO
87. WM0TQD18CK Tonja Dyche YES
88. WT8QT5RKT6 Mitchell Mellekas YES
89. XMM16J0XZT Mitchell Mellekas YES
90. XP56915J41 Rosaria Durisseau NO
91. XXJ88CZSM1 Cassey Bulik NO
92. Z2DGJPQQHH Brynn Eckley NO
93. Z3NRQLFPNM Tonja Dyche NO
94. Z9TL0HTHQM Tonja Dyche NO
95. ZMF28GFQHM Brynn Eckley NO
96. ZQN01D99QK Rosaria Durisseau YES
97. ZTPRBBM6XQ Cassey Bulik NO
Secret Ballots: These lists aren't in corresponding order!
Download the data to analyze it with your own tools.
A returns website could look slicker than this! And the data could be more complex. But this illustrates the core idea.
You may know this famous quote, apocryphally attributed to Joseph Stalin:
"Those who vote decide nothing. Those who count the vote decide everything."
In a Clear Election, anyone and everyone can count the votes, and confirm the results.

In a Clear Election, you confirm that your ballot was counted.

Sample Ballot
Ballot ID Choose any ID ending
KQX87XHQ
F6 JG 1K H7 QW 9G
Candidate: Choose One
Cassey Bulik
Tonja Dyche
Mitchell Mellekas
Brynn Eckley
Rosaria Durisseau
Spencer Kourt
Proposition: Choose One
NO
YES
When you vote, remember your Ballot ID. Only you know it. Keep it confidential!
Just to be sure nobody else has the same Ballot ID as you.
A real ballot or voting app could look slicker than this!
In a typical election today, you cast your ballot and then wait to hear the results.
But how can you be sure your vote was really counted?
In a Clear Election, you can easily check the returns data to make sure that your ballot is properly included.

In a Clear Election, the results can't be falsified

Are all the ballots real?
In a Clear Election, you can see if there are more cast ballots than turned out voters. And anyone who voted can check that their own ballot is correct.
Are all the voters real?
In a Clear Election, you can see who voted. If necessary, you can follow up independently by checking their bona-fides.
Did some some ballots disappear?
In a Clear Election, you can see if there are fewer cast ballots than turned-out voters. And anyone who voted can see that their own ballot is included.
Did some voters disappear?
In a Clear Election, anyone who voted can verify their name is included in the turnout.
If anything has gone amiss, the problem will be evident to voters and/or observers, and if so the election might need to be declared invalid. In a Clear Election, errors or malfeasance might
disrupt
an election, but can never cause a false outcome.

In a Clear Election, the returns data speaks for itself

In a conducting typical election today, most attention focuses on the process or the technology for voting, leading to the question:
How can we trust that the election process & mechanism don't allow cheating?
In a Clear Election, you can verify the returns data regardless of what mechanism was used to gather it.
Of course it's important to use a secure process and technology, to minimize the possibility of
disruption
and to maintain ballot secrecy. But in a Clear Election, no matter what flaws the process might have (and they all do have flaws) we can always validate the returns data.

Just do it

The principles of a Clear Election don't require any particular technology or methodology. The only special requirement is that your ballots should have secret, unique IDs that voters can use to check the returns.
And of course you need to make your returns data freely available—it could be as simple as putting the returns data in a spreadsheet which you put online somewhere the public can download it.

Use the
ClearElection.org
data format

Here at
ClearElection.org
we are developing an open data format for election returns.
Having a common data format means that we (or anybody nerdy enough) can build a variety of tools such as apps and web sites to simplify viewing, browsing, checking, tallying, and analyzing election returns. These tools could be used for any election, regardless of how it was held, as long as the election holders make the returns data available.
We at
ClearElection.org
are developing open-source returns analysis tools, as well as a platform to host and manage election returns data. If you'd like to alpha-test our platform for your election, .

Use the
ClearElection.org
Election Tools

Here at
ClearElection.org
we are developing open-source tools to make it easy to author and run a Clear Election:
Paper ballots
Tools that let you print ballots and sign-in sheets, and scan and process the paper returns.
Online voting
Tools to let you register voters; and for your voters, web or mobile apps to sign in and cast their ballots.
If you'd like to alpha-test our tools for your election, .

Mix and match

Here at
ClearElection.org
we don't expect all elections to fit exactly the same mold. And we don't want to force anyone to use our software in order to get the benefits of a Clear Election.
What are some examples of variants in elections and technology?
Voting apps that have customized look & feel; Different ways of authenticating voters, integrated with organizations' existing mechanisms; Tools for organizations that hold recurring elections; Elections that have different ballots for different voter segments; Specialized interfaces for disabled voters.
To facilitate the inherent variety in elections, we are developing open data formats and protocols not just for the election returns, but also for the various aspects of defining an election and running elections.
We envision a thriving ecosystem of election technology, that can include open-source, commercial, custom-built, and so forth. All growing out of the core principles that make a Clear Election simple, safe, and verifiable.

Election description

An election is defined by a JSON file at some URI. For example, see
http://info.clearelection.org/examples/election0.json
. An election definition includes, minimally:
schedule
The date & time at which polls open, i.e. voting begins, and the The date & time at which polls close, i.e. voting ends.
contests
The list of contests, each including the list of candidates and attributes about how to vote
returns
(After the polls have closed) The returns data: voters and ballots.
agents
(For an online election) The URIs for the signin and booth agents. See discussion below.
The syntax is specified by the JSON schema at
http://schemas.clearelection.org/election-0.0.schema.json
. For detailed documentation, see docs.clearelection.org
The election data is (mostly) static. When the election's manager first posts the election to its URI, it should include all data (except the returns data if the voting hasn't happened yet), and that data should never change. Once the polls close, the manager should add the complete returns data as a single atomic change. After that the election data should remain unchanged in perpetuity.
The election data is intended to be as simple and straightforward as possible. Accordingly, the schema does not address the "look & feel" of the election, i.e., no fonts or images or other styling info. Styling could be an ehnanced feature offered by third-party election tools.
We provide SDKs for convenient access and management:

Online Elections

Online elections have four indepdendent components:
Election Manager
Responsible for creating/updating the election URI.
Signin Agent
Responsible for authenticating/authorizing voters
Booth Agent
Responsible for gathering filled ballots anonymously.
Voting Client
Presents a UI to the voters, taking them from the Signin Agent (to sign in) to the Booth agent (to fill out and cast their ballots)
The model for online voting is analogous to how a real-live polling place might work:
  1. You go to the signin desk, identify yourself to the agent there.
  2. The Signin Agent checks you against the voter roll, and notes down that you signed in.
  3. The Signin Agent gives you a ticket and says "take this over to the voting booth and give it to the agent there".
  4. You go the voting booth, and give your ticket to the agent.
  5. The Booth Agent checks that your ticket is legit.
  6. The Booth Agent hands you a ballot.
  7. You fill in your ballot, then cast it in the ballot box.
When polls close, the Election Manager gathers the list of signed-in voters from the Signin Agent and gathers the collection of ballots from the Ballot Agent.
Note that the manager isn't involved in the voting. Note that the Signin Agent never sees your ballot, and the Booth Agent doesn't know who you are.
The manager gets to choose who the agents are: the election definition includes the URIs for the agents; voting client and the agents themselves look at the election definition to know who their counterparts are.
Note that that by virtue of having well-defined protocols, these can really be indepdendent components. Though a given agent might or might not be willing to work on a given election; that's up to the agent (this allows paid services).
For more details, see docs.clearelection.org

Open Source

ClearElection is an open source project. All sources, schema definitions, protocols, documents, etc. are mastered online: The overall development roadmap is at:
We welcome comments, suggestions, and contributions!
Comment on code & protocol quality: We start from a base that by virtue of the ClearElection open data approach, it's impossible to get false results. So in some sense it doesn't make any difference how good or bad the code and protocols are.
That said, the worse the code & protocols are, the more likely it may be that an election could be disrupted through data loss or adversarial attacks. Or that anonymity could be compromised through some sort of attack. So of course we want the code to be as robust as possible to minimize those. We're deliberatly starting with a simple protocol to make it easy to demonstrate the whole process. But if/when this catches on we're happy to release improved protocol versions with higher reliability or security.

Q. Who won? Returns vs results

The ClearElection model emphasizes the
returns data,
i.e., the ballot and voter lists, rather than the
final results,
i.e. who won.
Why not "who won"? Because the "official" determination of the final results isn't always completely defined by the returns data. Rather, it is part of the social contract of the election. For example, there are questions such as how to resolve ties, who gets to decide that the results are officially correct, and whether the election returns may be challenged on some grounds (such as improper list of candidates, improper registry of voters, inappropriate poll times, lack of access to voting, etc...). As such determining "who won" is beyond the scope of ClearElection data modeling.
That said, in the future the ClearElection model may be updated to allow the final results to be added to the publicly accessible election data (along with some annotation as to the process which led to those results), just to keep that information available in perpetuity alongside the returns data.

Q. What about vote buying or coercion?

This is the boogeyman everyone worries about. But that concern, though not entirely unvalid, is largely misplaced.
explain the situation clearly: "Wholesale Fraud" vs "Retail Fraud", and so forth.
Q. Civic elections or private organizations?
Q. What if people lie about errors?
Q. Why doesn't everybody do this?
Q. How much does this cost?
Q. Who are you?
Q. What's your business model?
Q. Can I contribute?